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LAW WARS: AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT LAW REFORM
vs. CISG vs. CESL
LISA SPAGNOLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT is an interesting time to be an academic in the field of contract law inAustralia.  From our remote island, we look to the changes taking place
in European contract law.  We look to the development of Asian initiative
in the Principles of Asian Contract Law (PACL), the worldwide growth
and influence of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (CISG) and UNIDROIT Principles, and the
Swiss Proposal before the United Nations regarding the CISG.  From the
perspective of Australian lawyers, even those who primarily are interested
only in domestic contract law, all of this has recently become more than a
passing interest since Australia is potentially about to begin its own reform
process.  Accordingly, now, for the first time, Australian governments are
considering the spread of uniform law in the context of potential reform
of Australian law.  This paper considers briefly the Australian background,
the status of the current reform process, and the possible influences of
uniform law and harmonization efforts on the Australian position.
II. AUSTRALIAN BACKGROUND
Australia operates on the basis of a federal system which unified prior
colonies of the British Empire in 1900.  Under the Australian Federal Con-
stitution, specific areas of law are reserved to the national federal legisla-
ture, while some matters are said to be governed concurrently with the
provinces (states).  Residual concerns not specified in the Federal Consti-
tution are matters of state law.  Contract law falls into this category.
Accordingly, Australian contract law, which was based on the com-
mon law of England, has since federation been subjected to piecemeal
(and differing) legislative reform in each state, and to divergent court de-
cisions in each state.  Naturally, this has resulted in a number of diver-
gences between the law of contract in the different states.  It would be
wrong to overstate the significance of these differences.  Nonetheless, they
do result in unnecessary compliance and information costs.  Furthermore,
even where the substance of the law is exactly the same, the simple fact of
multiple sources of law—both legislative and judicial case law—creates
costs for those who must deal with the law applicable to domestic contracts
in Australia.  Moreover, much of Australian domestic contract law has in-
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creasingly proved anachronistic and complex, creating further unneces-
sary transaction costs for commercial parties.
A. Divergences in Australian Domestic Contract Law
While perhaps not the “chaotic mess” characteristic of the situation
that culminated in the publication of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) in the United States in 1952,1 Australia’s various states have man-
aged to develop a number of different rules in relation to contract.  Unfor-
tunately, unlike the United States, we do not have a body in the nature of
the American Law Institute (ALI).  It is also probably relevant that we only
have six states and two mainland territories, whereas the variations leading
to the UCC were spread across fifty states.
It is interesting that the ALI noted that the main defects in American
law at that time were “uncertainty and complexity.”2  Again, a federal sys-
tem, indeed, one which strongly influenced Australia’s constitutional
structure, had created a recipe for divergence.  The answer in that case
had been to harmonize by codification, driven by an independent non-
profit and well-respected scholarly organization.3
Australian jurisdictions differ in many regards:
• Degrees of Legislation: Some have contract law statutes, others do not
(for example, writing requirements).
• Privity: Following from the High Court decision in Trident4 almost
thirty years ago, the rules relating to third party benefit remain con-
fusing and in need of harmonization.  Some jurisdictions within
Australia (Queensland, Western Australia, Northern Territory)
have now eroded the privity rule, and now recognize contracts for
the benefit of third parties in some circumstances by means of stat-
ute,5 but these reforms are not uniform, and the circumstances in
which they apply are confusing.6  Moreover, other jurisdictions con-
tinue to rely upon the slow, confusing, and limited common law
1. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Curious Case of Transborder Sales Law: A Compara-
tive Analysis of CESL, CISG, and the UCC, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICA-
TION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 25, 27, 32 (Ulrich
Magnus ed., 2012).
2. See id. at 27.
3. See id. at 27–28.
4. Trident General Insurance Co. Ltd. v McNiece Bros. Pty. Ltd. (1988) 165 CLR
107 (Austl.).
5. See, e.g., Property Law Act 1974 (NT) s 56 (Austl.); Property Law Act 1974
(Qld) s 55 (Austl.); Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 11 (Austl.).
6. See Bryan Horrigan, Emmanuel Laryea & Lisa Spagnolo, Submission in Re-
sponse to Federal Attorney-General’s Discussion Paper ‘Improving Australia’s Law
and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper to Explore the Scope for Reforming
Australian Contract Law’ § 1.1.2. (July 20, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.
au/Consultations/Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/
Submission%20035%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20Horrigan%20
Laryea%20Spagnolo.pdf.
2
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developments, which on the whole do not reflect modern commer-
cial realities.7  Only for insurance contracts is there federal legisla-
tion to enable third party beneficiaries to take enforcement action.8
• Capacity: “The law relating to the capacity of natural persons to
enter into, or be bound by contracts they enter into, vary greatly
among the jurisdictions in Australia.”  Specifically, “[t]he categories
of incapacity are minority, mental incapacity, and intoxication.  Of
these, minority is the main issue . . . [and] the effect of a contract
with a minor and the consequences for the parties vary greatly
among the jurisdictions.”9  The reason is that “[t]he law on minor-
ity consists of a combination of common law (inconsistently ap-
plied) and state and territory legislation of varying content.”10
While “capacity may not be an issue in business to business (B2B)
contracts . . . it can be an issue in business to consumer (B2C) con-
tracts.  In online B2C contracts, where the parties may be located in
different jurisdictions, difficult issues may arise.”11
• Proportionate Liability: This differs across the various jurisdictions.
• Inconsistent Legislation: Some retain inconsistent legislation, or have
not enacted legislation despite agreement between the jurisdictions
to act in a uniform manner.12
7. Following from the Trident case, where limited third party rights were rec-
ognized for an insurance contract.  However, reasons for the High Court decision
varied in their scope and basis, and the law still remains underdeveloped and
uncertain.
8. See Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 48 (Austl.).
9. Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 1.1.4.
10. See id.  The Submission further notes:
NSW has a comprehensive statute, the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act
1970 (NSW).  Victorian law needs to be gleaned from the Age of Majority
Act 1977 (Vic) and some provisions in Goods Act 1958 (Vic) and the Su-
preme Court Act 1986 (Vic).  Queensland’s law consist of Law Reform Act
1995 (QLD), and the common law.  In SA, the law is to be found in Age of
Majority (Reduction) Act 1971 (SA) and the Minors’ Contracts (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1979 (SA).  WA’s law comprises Age of Majority Act 1972
(WA) and the Statute of Frauds (Amendment) Act 1828 (UK) (“Lord
Tenterden’s Act”) in its original form as imperial legislation.  Tasmania,
ACT and NT all have a combination of statutes and the common law.
Id.
11. Id. § 1.1.5.
12. Two examples should suffice: NSW “curiously” retains the Contracts Review
Act 1980 despite the fact that an agreement was reached between states to repeal
all inconsistent legislation upon enactment of the ACL. See Luke Nottage, The
Government’s Proposed “Review of Australian Contract Law”: A Preliminary Posi-
tive Response 5 (July 16, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/
Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission%2000
8%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20Dr%20Luke%20Nottage.pdf.
Also, despite agreement five years ago amongst the State Attorneys General
(SCAG) to implement the ECC, the process is still incomplete, with Queensland
still not having yet passed the legislation to update its ETA.
3
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B. Complex and Antiquated Australian Contract Law
Australia’s sales laws imply certain non-mandatory terms concerning
domestic commercial sales law contracts, such as the need for goods to
meet their description, merchantable quality, and fitness for purpose.13
These laws, however, date from the early 19th century.14  Even this is
painting far too kind a picture, because the provisions of those laws were
themselves drawn from the English legislation with its origins at the time
of the industrial revolution.  It goes without saying that commercial do-
mestic sales laws in Australia are rather antiquated.
Overlaid onto this regime is the Australian Consumer and Competition
Act 2010, which incorporates the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).  This is
a far-reaching federal statute, which implements Australia’s competition
law, but which also contains consumer protection measures, including
rules on misleading conduct in all trade and commerce, and rules on un-
conscionable conduct.  The law also provides for mandatory implied
terms, for example warranting quality, in relation to consumer contracts.
Recently updated, the law maintains the basic structures in relation to im-
plied terms present in its predecessor from 1974,15 with a few tweaks.16
Australia suffers from many legislative and common law overlaps.
The existence of legislation often will not prevent application of the com-
mon law, resulting in a range of remedies pursuant to statute and com-
mon law (including equitable relief).  This can seriously compound the
complexity of the law related to, for example, enforceability of contracts of
indemnity and guarantees, which can not only be rendered unenforceable
on grounds of unconscionable conduct under common law (particularly
on the basis of equitable relief), but also on statutory grounds arising pur-
suant to the new legislative definition of unconscionability.17
The High Court of Australia has not helped clarify many areas where
this would be desirable.  In matters of state law, unlike the US Supreme
Court, the Australian High Court has the capacity to resolve differences
between the case law in various jurisdictions, or to clarify areas in which
confusion has arisen.  However, for many reasons, it frequently fails to do
so.
One such area is the parol evidence rule, which has remained stuck in
a time warp in Australia, despite its progression in the U.K.  While the
House of Lords under Lord Hoffman has broadened the test, Australia
still requires “ambiguity” to exist before extrinsic evidence is admissible to
interpret the intention of the parties.  The High Court has consistently
said that a time will come when this rule will be revisited, amid attempts by
13. As this is a matter of state law, a different statute applies in each state and
territory.
14. See Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas) (Austl.).
15. See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Austl.) (repealed 2011).
16. One was the change from “merchantable quality” to “acceptable quality.”
17. See Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 2.10.
4
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lower courts to forge ahead and recognize the utility of extrinsic evidence
such as conversations.  However, the High Court has been saying this for
almost thirty years, and as recently as last year, repeated its mantra of
preventing further development until it had re-examined the issue, simul-
taneously refusing to take on a case which raised just such a question.18
The High Court has also failed to clarify whether a general duty to per-
form contractual obligations in good faith exists,19 whether terms of ear-
lier contracts can be incorporated into later contracts by conduct,20 and
what will suffice for consideration.
The “prior legal duty” or “existing legal duty” rule states that where an
obligation is already owed, that obligation cannot be offered as good con-
sideration to support a new promise.  To overcome this strict rule, the
“practical benefit” exception eliminates the effect of the prior legal duty
rule in certain circumstances.  However, this rule, originally developed in
the U.K.,21 is troublesome to say the least.  Furthermore, it has been modi-
fied where applied in Australia,22 and is not applied consistently through-
out all Australian jurisdictions.  It appears that New South Wales’ courts
are more willing to find the exception exists, but courts in other jurisdic-
tions are less willing, and in any event the rule is very uncertain, and theo-
retically hard to justify.
Indeed, given the growth in equitable concepts of estoppel, the entire
concept of consideration may need a more major overhaul, as it has
caused serious problems in variations of contract, where often commercial
practices are such that modifications lack consideration.
It should be noted that consideration is not a requirement of contract
in the CISG or in civil law jurisdictions.  Thus, the problem posed by the
existing legal duty rule in Australia (and some other common law jurisdic-
tions) does not arise in contracts governed by the CISG or the contract law
of civil law jurisdictions.
As Luke Nottage discusses in his submission to the Attorney-General’s
Department, High Court rulings in the area of contract law often seem
18. See Western Export Servs., Inc. v Jireh International Pty. Ltd. [2011] HCA 45
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2011/45.html.
19. See AUSTRALIAN ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, IMPROVING AUSTRALIA’S LAW
AND JUSTICE FRAMEWORK: A DISCUSSION PAPER TO EXPLORE THE SCOPE FOR RE-
FORMING AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT LAW 8 (2012) [hereinafter ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S
DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER], available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Docu
ments/ReviewofAustraliancontractlaw/DiscussionpaperImprovingAustraliaslaw
andjusticeframeworkAdiscussionpaperexploringthescopeforreformingAustralian
contractlaw.pdf; see also Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, at 18 n.57
(“High Court expressly declined to address the status, content, and limits of good
faith under Australian contract law in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v
South Sydney City Council”).  No suitable test case for revisiting such issues had
reached the High Court by mid-2012.
20. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 8.
21. See Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd., [1991] 1 Q.B. 1
(Eng.).
22. See Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd. [1994] 34 NSWLR 723 (Austl.).
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antiquated in many respects by comparison with international standards.23
One such finding is the refusal of the High Court to recognize the admissi-
bility of subsequent conduct as evidence of what parties originally in-
tended in relation to the interpretation of contractual terms,24 the
requirement of impossibility rather than commercial impracticability to
trigger frustration, and “insistence that the only relief available is auto-
matic termination of the contract” should frustration be found.25
In Australia, there has been an unfortunate tendency for multiple
judgements even amongst majority and minority decisions in the High
Court.  The result has been, even in decisions meant to “clarify” previously
confusing areas of law, or where the law has been advanced to a degree,
such as the incremental recognition of third party enforcement in Trident,
a confusing array of reasoning and lack of direction in the law.26  In other
words, more complexity.  This can lead to injustice, with parties able to
behave opportunistically.27
There is one respect in which Australian law is certainly not anti-
quated.  Electronic Transactions Acts have been enacted in each of the
states and territories except for Queensland, which reflect the 2005
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts (ECC).28  Furthermore, it is anticipated at the
time of writing that Queensland is about to introduce a bill to enact the
latter.  This means that Australia is one of the jurisdictions at the forefront
of modernization in relation to electronic transactions.  Ironically, this
does not address the many fundamental problems already indicated, al-
though it gives some indication that where a need for reform is perceived,
Australian lawmakers can implement change, albeit slowly and not always
uniformly.
III. AUSTRALIAN REFORM AGENDA
A. Preface to 2012: The Profession
Until recent times, despite these problems, there has been little appe-
tite for law reform for Australian contract law.  The legal profession has
appeared content to live with anachronism, complexity, and divergence,
in an attitude of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!”  Undoubtedly, the succes-
sive waves of legislative reform in relation to specific subject matters—con-
sumer law, credit codes, tenancies, securities law—were enough to keep
23. See generally Nottage, supra note 12. R
24. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 8.
25. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 5. R
26. See Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 1.1.2 (explaining situa-
tion for other jurisdictions that have not implemented statutes dealing with privity
rule remains confusing, and federal legislation only removes uncertainty in Trident
for insurance contracts).
27. See id. § 1.1.1.
28. See G.A. Res. 60/21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21, (Dec. 9, 2005).
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both the profession and academics well-occupied, and most probably have
dampened the capacity for change to something as fundamental as con-
tract law.
In particular, despite the pivotal role played by key Australians in the
development of uniform law at the international level—first, in relation to
the CISG, then the UNIDROIT Principles—it has been interesting to note
the time warp in the Australian legal profession’s recognition of the im-
portance and utility of the CISG.  Likewise, while case numbers slowly
grow in frequency in Australia, the judiciary has consistently shown a lack
of understanding or interest in the correct application of the CISG.  Fre-
quently, counsel fail to plead the CISG where it is the applicable law, and
it is overlooked by the court.  The profession still maintains the practice of
routinely excluding the CISG in drafting contracts.  This is almost poign-
ant, given the widespread participation of many Australian teams in the
Vis Moot, and the tremendous success which Australian law schools enjoy
in the Moot.  This author has previously explained this lack of uptake on a
number of bases, including failure to include the CISG in general contract
law curricula, and on law firm culture as a group dynamic, influencing
young lawyers against advising the use of the CISG.
Around 2010, a number of senior judicial officers and academics be-
gan to point out the lack of engagement of the profession in Australia with
international law.  Justice Paul Finn, a judge of the Australian Federal
Court and academic who has been instrumental in the UNIDROIT move-
ment,29 Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court,30 and Chief
Justice Robert French of the Australian High Court31 each remarked in
different papers on Australia’s “isolationist” legal attitude.  The current
author’s own summary of the manner in which the CISG had been re-
ceived in Australia was published in 2009.32  These laments were picked
up in academic and extra-curial commentary, but little progress seemed
apparent.
Since that time, Australian law firms, themselves with high hopes of
expanding into Asia and beyond, have increasingly merged with global law
firms.  Almost all of the former “big four” firms have merged; Linklaters
with the former Allens Arthur Robinson, King & Wood with the former
29. See Paul Finn, Internationalisation or Isolation: The Australian Cul De Sac?  The
Case of Contract, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAK-
ING, PRACTICE AND EDUCATION 145 (Mary Hiscock & William Van Caenegem eds.,
2010).
30. See Justice Michael Kirby, Overcoming Australia’s Equity Isolationism, 3 J. EQ.
1 (2009) (Austl.).
31. See Robert French, Chief Justice, High Court of Austl., Speech at Supreme
Court of New South Wales Annual Conference: International Law and Australian
Domestic Law 6–8 nn.9–11, 13 (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.
au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj21aug09.pdf.
32. See Lisa Spagnolo, The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Opt Outs, Misapplica-
tions and the Costs of Ignoring the Vienna Sales Convention for Australian Lawyers, 10
MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L LAW 141 (2009).
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Mallesons, Ashurst with Blake Dawson, and Herbert Smith with Freehills.
Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance, and Norton Rose have all entered the
Australian market.33  Australia seemed to have escaped the global finan-
cial crisis relatively unscathed, but it was felt amongst the legal profession.
The face of the profession has changed under pressure from slowing eco-
nomic activity, a booming mining industry, and large growth in trade with
Asia.
B. Events of 2012
Somewhat surprisingly, on March 22, 2012, the Australian Federal At-
torney-General issued a discussion paper canvassing the possibility of re-
forming Australian contract law.  The stated aim of the discussion paper
was to assist the Australian government “[to] explor[e] the scope for re-
forming Australian contract law” to make it simpler, fairer, and more
efficient.34
The discussion paper refers to reasons for considering reform of Aus-
tralian domestic contract law, including problems with:
• accessibility;
• certainty;
• simplification;
• setting standards of conduct;
• supporting innovation;
• e-commerce;
• supporting relational contracts;
• small and medium-sized businesses;
• internal harmonisation; and
• internationalisation.
The possibility of a codified law modernized to reflect international
trends was mooted.  The discussion paper noted the judicial and academic
criticisms mentioned above.  A number of “infolets” were issued, each de-
tailing specific areas of potential reform, including one of which referred
comprehensively to the UNIDROIT Principles.  The CISG’s role in Austra-
lia was also noted.  Specifically, the discussion paper called for submissions
from academics, the profession, and others on the following questions:
1. What are the main problems experienced by users of Australian
contract law?  Which drivers of reform are the most important for
contract law?  Are there any other drivers of reform that should be
considered?
2. What costs, difficulties, inefficiencies, or lost opportunities do busi-
nesses experience as a result of the domestic operation of Austra-
lian contract law?
33. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 4.
34. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19.
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3. How can Australian contract law better meet the emerging needs
of the digital economy?  In what circumstances should online
terms and conditions be given effect?
4. To what extent do businesses experience costs, difficulties, ineffi-
ciencies, or lost opportunities as a result of differences between
Australian and foreign contract law?
5. What are the costs and benefits of internationalising Australian
contract law?
6. Which reform options (restatement, simplification, or substantial
reform of contract law) would be preferable? What benefits and
costs would result from each?
7. How should any reform of contract law be implemented?
8. What next steps should be conducted? Who should be involved?
A number of months were allowed for submissions on the discussion
paper, and submissions closed on July 20, 2012.  The submissions received
were predominantly from academics, non-lawyer professional/business
groups, lawyer associations, and law firms (in that order).35  There were
fifty-eight written submissions and sixty-five online survey responses from
the public.36
In June 2012 two open consultations forums were held and these were
attended by representatives of peak bodies, as well as consumer, business,
academic, legal, and professional stakeholders.37  Five further consulta-
tions were held with individuals unable to attend the open sessions.  At-
tendees from the legal profession were in general terms in favour of
specific piecemeal reform, but opposed to a code, and not in favour of
utilizing international instruments of harmonized law if reforms were to
be implemented.
35.  Non-confidential submissions were published online on November 21,
2012. See Submissions to the Review of Australian Contract Law, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S
DEPARTMENT, http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/SubmissionstotheRe
viewofAustralianContractLaw.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).  The Attorney-Gen-
eral’s Department Report to Senate Standing Committee lists the authors of for-
mal submissions.  There were submissions from academics (16); non-lawyer
professional/business associations (15); lawyer associations/peak bodies (9); law-
yers/law firms (6) as well as corporations/in-house lawyers (2); government (2)
and a further eight submissions. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO
SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (2012)
[hereinafter REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE], available at http://www.aph.gov.
au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/
estimates/sup_1213/ag/QoN_57-CLD.pdf.
36. See REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 35.
37. Notably, a few large law firms and legal professional associations partici-
pated in the process including Ashurst (formerly Blake Dawson Waldron), Herbert
Smith Freehills (formerly Freehills), King & Wood Mallesons and the Law Council
of Australia, Australian Academy of Law, Australian Business Lawyers and Advisers,
Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Australian Government Solicitor, and
the NSW Young Lawyers. See id.
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It is interesting to also reflect upon the nature of the written submis-
sions.  There were a number of submissions from non-legal professional
bodies which were concerned with single points, such as the need to ad-
dress fairness of contractual terms for the protection of their members.38
Some called for specific harmonization legislation in respect of the diver-
gent areas mentioned above.39  Those that addressed the issue at all,
tended to oppose federal codification generally on rather vague bases.40
As one would expect, the legal profession tended to be more specific.
For example, the peak body representing in-house lawyers working for
corporations in Australia mentioned the issues of divergence and the need
for harmonization between the states in the areas discussed earlier.41  It
also called for simplification and centralization of contract law, but op-
posed internationalization along the lines of the CISG.
Codification or centralization of contract law at the federal level
found more favour amongst academics.  The Australian Academy of Law,
comprised of academics and judges, simply pointed out that the process
would be difficult due to overlaps, and would require extensive consulta-
tion (after arguing for rectification of divergences between states).42
Many preferred codification and/or a soft law restatement of principles.43
Justice Bathurst in his personal submission expressed doubt that a na-
tional code would improve predictability, and argued it may lead to confu-
sion and rigidity.44  His Honour noted that any code would need to be
interpreted and would become overlaid with case law in any event, thus
38. See Ass’n of Prof’l Eng’rs, Scientists & Managers, Austl., Review of Austra-
lian Contract Law (July 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/
Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission%2000
9%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20APESMA.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Austl. Bankers’ Ass’n, Improving Australia’s Law and Justice
Framework—Discussion Paper Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law 4
(Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Sub
missionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission%20057%20-%20Con-
tract%20Law%20Review%20-%20Australian%20Bankers%20Association.pdf;
Austl. Chamber of Commerce & Indus., Response to Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment Discussion Paper (July 27, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consulta
tions/Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission
%20049%20-%20ACCI%20-%20for%20publication.pdf.
40. See Austl. Bankers’ Ass’n, supra note 39, at 3–4.
41. See Austl. Corporate Lawyers Ass’n, Improving Australia’s Law and Justice
Framework: Reforming Australian Contract Law 3 (July 20, 2012) [hereinafter
ACLA], available at http://www.acla.com.au/documents/item/1023.
42. See generally Australian Academy of Law, Response to Attorney-General’s
Department Discussion Paper (July 23, 2012), http://www.ag.gov.au/Consulta
tions/Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission
%20041%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20Australian%20Academy%
20of%20Law.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, at 23; Nottage, supra
note 12, at 12–14.
44. See Thomas Frederick Bathurst, Codification of Contract Law—A Flawed Pro-
posal, CONT. L. REV. 1, 6–8 [hereinafter Bathurst Submission], available at http://
www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralian-
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becoming unpredictable.  Further, a code could never be fully compre-
hensive without becoming far too detailed.
While these arguments are quite valid, in truth they are not reasons
why a code should not be adopted per se.  No one code can ever provide
all the answers.  Neither the common law nor a code can ever be totally
predictable.  The real question must be directed to whether a code can
bring relative improvements in predictability, reduction of complexity,
and gains in accessibility by comparison with what we have presently.
The argument attributes little weight to the benefit of reducing the
number of sources of law (by comparison with various pieces of state and
federal legislation, state case law and federal case law), and resultant im-
provement in the accessibility of the law.  Of course, post-code, the law
must continue to be developed by court interpretation, and must respond
to sociological, economic, and technological change.45  With respect, this
fact cannot serve as an argument in favour of common law and against
codification, since such adaptations must occur irrespective of whether the
basic rule or principle derives from a case or legislative text—in other
words, the law must grow in either case to fit new circumstances regardless
of its form.  However, even after the law continues to develop by means of
judicial interpretation, one significant benefit of codification is the overall
ordering of concepts within a single framework, to which cases themselves
refer and to which those cases, regardless of court system, become refera-
ble, indexed, and more easily accessible.
This is not to say that such benefits are worth the transition costs of
reform.  However, a balanced perspective needs to be maintained between
the costs and benefits of a single centralized consolidation, especially if a
large part of the problem is the complexity and overlap of sources of laws
and remedies across and within jurisdictions in Australia.  If a code is
aimed at removing existing problems of divergence, or more importantly,
reforming the rules of contract law in a way the present system has been
unable to achieve, then perhaps the price may be worth it.
As Australia debates and weighs its options in relation to “internation-
alizing” its domestic law of contract, various questions arise.
IV. DOES AUSTRALIAN NEED LAW REFORM?
The first question must be whether any reform to Australian contract
law is necessary, useful, or even worthwhile.  Clearly, the profession as a
whole appears to think little needs to be done.
There can always be an easy argument against change.  Every change
involves costs.  However, this must be weighed against the background of
the ageing and complexity of certain parts of Australian contract law, and
the areas in which divergences occur.  Furthermore, as various jurisdic-
ContractLaw/Submission%20055%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20
Bathurst.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
45. See id. at 6.
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tions around the world adopt domestic laws that are based upon the same
harmonized uniform models, Australian law may well increasingly stand
out as different from the rest.
Difference in and of itself is not necessarily bad, and may even en-
courage some parties to select Australian law to govern their contracts.
However, the reality is that difference involves learning costs and uncer-
tainty.  Coupled with the need to modernize and harmonize across the
states, this may motivate any future reform of domestic contract law to
seriously look at harmonized instruments as a basis for any new rules.
As some commentators observe, there are other reasons prompting a
revisiting of Australian contract law.  Nottage points out that consumer law
growth is one driver, as well as the changes to the legal landscape through
widespread mergers of large home-grown law firms with the major mul-
tinational legal firms and/or entry of those firms into the Australian law
market, prompted by the mining boom and high levels of trade with
Asia.46
There are significant complexities in Australian contract law which
simply don’t need to be there—as discussed earlier, for example, the need
for consideration, the admissibility of various forms of evidence about in-
tention, and divergence on questions of capacity, frustration, and third
parties.  There are issues which should be addressed and modernized—for
example, consideration and good faith.  However, it may be the case that
some actors within the Australian law market also stand to benefit most
from the maintenance of such divergence and complexity.
Australian legal practice has boomed in recent decades as the level of
complexity in the law has increased.  Obviously this is not solely attributa-
ble to growth in legal complexity alone, but as anticipated by several com-
mentators, it is noteworthy that some of the most vocal opposition to
simplification comes from law firms.47  Like any economic actor, path de-
pendent behaviour within law firms and opposition to change within the
legal profession must be anticipated as a normal heuristic behaviour and
group dynamic, even where the change would be substantively efficient for
clients.  Previously, the author has analysed exactly such behaviour at
length in relation to choices to opt out of the CISG, despite its compara-
tive efficiency.48
46. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 4.
47. This was predicted in some submissions. See, e.g., Horrigan, Laryea &
Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 1.8 (“For contract law . . . there are . . . conflicting eco-
nomic interests . . . in relation to . . . reform . . . entail[ing] moral hazard issues
and path dependent behaviours . . . .  [Thus] any change will . . . meet resistance
from the bulk of the legal profession, irrespective of benefits to business.”); Not-
tage, supra note 12, at 7.
48. See Lisa Spagnolo, Truth or Dare? The Interrelatedness of the Efficiency of the
CISG, Influences on Lawyers’ Choice of Law and Interpretation 174, 189, 202–16 (Ph.D.
Thesis, 2012) [hereinafter Truth or Dare]; see also Lisa Spagnolo, Green Eggs & Ham:
The CISG, Path Dependence, and the Behavioural Economics of Lawyers’ Choices of Law in
International Sales Contracts 6 J. PRIVATE INT’L LAW 417, 435–39, 445–53, 456 (2010)
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Therefore, opposition from the profession is not altogether surpris-
ing given the learning costs involved for firms and the self-reinforcing risk-
reward structures created by the complex environment, despite the fact
that change may significantly improve the transaction costs and efficiency
of doing business for their clients.49  Costs of inefficiency are presently not
borne by the profession, but by business which may contract sub-optimally
as a result of inefficient laws, therefore there is little incentive for law firms
to support change.50
Furthermore, the law market is one of specialist expertise, and lawyers
control that expertise.  Information asymmetry may have a powerful im-
pact on the potential for any efficient reform.51  Consequently, while loss
of GDP contributions from legal services might be far outweighed by
growth in general business contributions to GDP due to reforms,52 the
vocal and organized lobbying of the legal profession is likely to carry more
weight in the reform process.
V. WHAT MODEL FOR AUSTRALIAN REFORM?
If Australian contract law should indeed be reformed, then the sec-
ond question that arises is to which model should it look for inspiration?
There are a number of competing models of harmonized laws on the mar-
ket.  Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and each is shaped by the
times and institutional influences that led to its creation.53
Additionally, the CISG has clearly influenced law reform in many ju-
risdictions, and that influence has prompted the present Australian re-
view.  However, another influential harmonizing law reform is on the
horizon—the Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL).  Therefore,
this paper asks a final question: Will the CISG still be able to influence
non-European domestic law reform projects, such as the one being consid-
ered in Australia?  Or—will CESL be more influential on future non-Euro-
pean law reform?
[hereinafter Green Eggs] (discussing reasons for lawyer persistence in exclusion of
CISG despite its efficiency at substantive and procedural levels compared with rela-
tive efficiency of alternative choices of law).
49. See Truth or Dare, supra note 48, at 202–16; see also Green Eggs, supra note 48,
at 444–53.
50. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 6. R
51. See Truth or Dare, supra note 48, at 196–202; see also Green Eggs, supra note
48, 439–44.
52. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 6. R
53. See generally Sandeep Gopalan, A Demandeur-Centric Approach to Regime De-
sign in Transnational Commercial Law, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 327 (2008); see also Clayton
P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25 INT’L
REV. L. ECON. 446, 479–84 (2005).
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A. CISG
Synchronizing Australian domestic law with the law applicable to in-
ternational sales in Australia and with the law forming the basis for many
domestic law reform initiatives throughout the world seems a sensible ap-
proach.  It would minimize transaction costs and improve predictability
for outcomes.  It would also address a considerable problem in Australia—
resistance to the use and application of the CISG by practitioners and
courts.  The negative attitude of the profession toward the CISG was noted
by the Attorney-General’s Department.54
Some of the submissions indeed demonstrate disquiet about using the
CISG as the basis for domestic law reform.55  However, as might be ex-
pected given the low levels of familiarity with CISG in Australia, such con-
cerns frequently demonstrate a level of ignorance about the CISG rather
than any serious substantive problem with it.  Indeed, it could not other-
wise have already served as the model for reform in many jurisdictions.56
The rules in the CISG have been tried and tested and found generally
successful enough to form the basis for domestic reform elsewhere.  The
CISG is the basis for domestic reforms including the African OHADA,57
the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), the Draft European
Union CESL Regulation, the modernized German Law of Obligations, the
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, the law of Estonia and
most modern Eastern European sales laws, as well as the Nordic sales legis-
lation, and the New Draft Japanese Civil Code.58  For commercial transac-
tions, the CISG is an appropriate basis for reform in Australia.  The
54. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 8.
55. See ACLA, supra note 41, at 4 (arguing that it would mean that goods
could not be returned on basis of failure of fitness for purpose).  This is incorrect.
If the breach is a fundamental breach pursuant to Article 25 then the contract can
be avoided. See id.
56. The CISG has had direct impact on domestic law in China, Germany,
Scandinavia, Japan, Que´bec, Czech Republic, Russia, and Estonia.  It has affected
reforms in the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Greece, and the African OHADA
member states.  It has had an indirect impact on the domestic law of Denmark,
France, and Italy via the European Union Directive on certain aspects of the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees. See Council Directive 99/44, 1999 O.J.
(L 171) 12 (EC) (European Union Directive on Sale of Consumer Goods and As-
sociated Guarantees).
57. See ORG. FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF BUS. LAW IN AFRICA (OHADA), DO-
ING BUSINESS 2011: MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR ENTREPRENEURS (2011), http://www.
eisourcebook.org/cms/Organisation%20for%20the%20Harmonization%20of%
20Business%20Law%20in%20Africa.pdf.  In particular, see the section on sales,
which the Swiss Proposal refers to as “practically a transcript” of the CISG. See U.N.
G.A. Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Proposal by Switzerland on Possible
Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International Contract Law, 3, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/758, 45th Sess. (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal].  However, the
Swiss Proposal also notes modifications in the OHADA sales section, and that a
further project on broader contract law drawing from UNIDROIT Principles
seems to have stalled. See id. at 5–6.
58. See Swiss Proposal, supra note 57, at 3.
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Attorney-General’s discussion paper gives the impression that the depart-
ment is aware of the CISG’s influence elsewhere on reform projects, but is
wary and seeking to test the waters.
B. UNIDROIT Principles
Modelling Australian domestic law on the UNIDROIT Principles of
Commercial Contracts would similarly align the domestic law with other
reformed domestic laws that have drawn from UNIDROIT, including most
relevantly for Australia, China.  Naturally, since UNIDROIT is structured
upon the CISG, this also largely achieves the alignment of laws applicable
to domestic contracts with those applicable to international contracts
within Australia.
Notably, the UNIDROIT Principles go further than the CISG, so mod-
elling upon UNIDROIT Principles would introduce new concepts hitherto
not known to Australian domestic law.  They deal with validity, agency,
contracts benefiting third parties, set-off, limitation periods, assignment,
illegality, multi-party contracts, and contractual unwinding.  UNIDROIT
Principles are drafted by non-government representatives who are aiming
for an “ideal” solution.  Not being restricted by the need to represent na-
tional interests, obviously the UNIDROIT Principles have been capable of
a more expansive reach.  However, for nations uncomfortable with the
CISG for its civilian overtones, some of these “ideal” solutions, while logi-
cally attractive, may nonetheless be a step too far.
The UNIDROIT Principles have rightfully had a significant influence
on the Attorney-General’s discussion paper, and have themselves formed
the basis for an entire “infolet” attachment to the discussion paper.59
C. CESL
The proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) is “a major ad-
vancement of the idea of a European cont[r]act [sic] law.”60  It has been
claimed that the CESL is “an attempt at harmonizing an increasing[ly]
chaotic set of Directives.”61
The proposed regulation of the European Union avoids the political
minefields of a comprehensive civil code, or even general contract law,
and instead targets consumer protection harmonization as well as online
trading and related services.62  Consequently, it attempts to provide for
cross-border transactions by consumers and small-to-medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs), and can be applicable to all commercial transactions if the
59. See generally ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES: LES-
SONS FOR AUSTRALIA? (2012), http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/
ReviewofAustraliancontractlaw/TheUNIDROITPrincipleslessonsforAustralia.pdf
(infolet attached to Attorney-General’s discussion paper).
60. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 25. R
61. See id. at 33.
62. See id.
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adopting member state so wishes.63  Nonetheless, its application is pro-
posed as an “opt-in” regime; that is, parties will need to select CESL to
govern their contract.  The inclusion of a “review clause” in the CESL
hints that it is a stepping-stone to a broader future contract code.64
Thus, like the CISG, it is an instrument aimed at harmonization.  The
CESL has been strongly influenced by the CISG,65 as was its formative
predecessor, the DCFR.  Unlike the CISG, mandatory rules predominate
the CESL.  As one might expect, the CESL consumer provisions are
mandatory, but additionally, the CESL cannot be opted into in part, even
for non-consumer transactions.66
The CESL has its advantages and disadvantages, which are examined
in far more detail elsewhere.  Its interpretive sections build upon those in
the CISG, in particular, autonomous interpretation, resort to general prin-
ciples, and trade usages and practices.  These sections of the CESL help-
fully and expressly enunciate principles, and refer expressly to purposive
interpretation “having regard to the nature and purpose of the contract,”
something only implicit in the CISG.67  The CESL’s reference to trade
usages is not limited to international usages like the CISG, and CESL ex-
pressly refers to a “reasonableness” standard in its interpretive
methodology.68
Much has been said about the CESL’s structure, which is complex
because it attempts to regulate both B2B and B2C transactions separately
when it might have been simpler to regulate them within a unified set of
remedial provisions.69  Many critics believe it was manifestly unwise to try
to regulate both types of transactions in the one instrument at all, includ-
ing the present writer.  As Castellani notes:
63. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, art. 13(a), COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10,
2011) [hereinafter CESL], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF.
64. See id. art. 15.
65. See Swiss Proposal, supra note 57, at 5 (comparing CISG with CESL); see also
DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 31 (arguing this is especially so in relation to formation R
of contract).  The CISG directly influenced the Draft Common Frame of Refer-
ence for the European Union, especially IV.A on sales, but also II on contract
formation, and III on obligations and remedies. See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND
MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE
(DCFR) (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009); see also id. at 1329–30, § IV.A.-2:306
n.1 (discussing third party rights or claims based on industrial property or other
intellectual property, which subsequently formed basis for CESL)
66. See CESL, supra note 63, art. 11.
67. See id. art. 5; see also id. arts. 1–4; DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 41. R
68. Compare CESL, supra note 63, art. 5, with U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law,
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art.
9, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
69. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 33. R
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Consumer protection rules should be of mandatory application
in order to be effective, while rules applicable to business-to-busi-
ness transactions need to be optional in order to ensure freedom
of contract.  This explains why the two sets of rules are usually
kept separate.  How the two goals could be pursued in the same
instrument remains unclear given the optional nature of the
[CESL].70
The idea of treating SMEs differently than larger business is not com-
pletely new to Australian “consumer” protection laws.  Despite the obvi-
ous, inherent problem of defining an SME, the effect of drawing various
lines often fails to deal with the underlying aim of correcting for various
informational asymmetries or differences in bargaining power.71  Further-
more, one must query the difficulty of isolating SMEs in an environment
where corporate acquisition and restructuring are not at all uncommon.
Nonetheless, it appears that the regulation of SMEs may in part be moti-
vated by a desire to capture some B2B relationships within the CESL
framework.  Unfortunately, this would tend to encroach upon the B2B
transactions harmonized under CISG, thereby increasing, rather than re-
ducing, fragmentation.72  The inclusion of “standard terms” as opposed to
“negotiated terms” also presents considerable confusion, and the varying
manner in which they are dealt with throughout the CESL is somewhat
perplexing.73
Given that Australia presently implies terms into commercial and con-
sumer sales under separate statutes, and relies upon common law for gen-
eral rules of contract, it would be a vast and unwise step for Australia to
adopt a combined and therefore problematic regime like the CESL.  How-
ever, given that the CESL is the most recent harmonized regime in the
area, there should be no doubt that it will be examined in the process of
reform in Australia.
Significantly, as was noted in the Attorney-General’s discussion paper,
optional regimes for contractual rules will often fail to succeed in Australia
due to practitioner resistance.74  The comment was originally made in re-
lation to the CISG, which Australian practitioners frequently exclude.75
However, one would imagine that the CESL model of opting in would be
70. Luca Castellani, CISG in Time of Crisis: An Opportunity for Increased Efficiency,
in 4TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CONFERENCE: GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGION-
ALIZATION 44 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2013).
71. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 25. R
72. See CISG Advisory Council Declaration No. 1, The CISG and Regional
Harmonization (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?
ipkCat=128&ifkCat=217&sid=217.
73. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, CESL and CISG, in 4TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECH-
TRIEM CONFERENCE: GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALIZATION 109–11 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo, eds. 2013).
74. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 20.
75. See id. at 17.
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even less effective unless widespread support from lobby groups was gar-
nered first, something that might be unlikely for any code resembling the
CESL in Australia.  Furthermore, the comment in the discussion paper
makes it clear that the Attorney-General is well aware of the potential
weakness in such a model.
The CESL as a consumer law regime has considerable potential to
protect consumers (and SMEs).  Like UNIDROIT Principles, it also goes
far further than the CISG, but it does so by implementing provisions on
issues with consent, unfair terms, pre-contractual disclosure requirements,
and electronic contracts.  The CESL is structurally challenging, very far
reaching, and simultaneously, does not govern some areas which it might
have dealt with (such as capacity, ownership, the concurrent possibility of
tort/contract liability, or illegality).76
Above all else, the CESL is not a suitable regime for commercial trans-
actions.  Its far reaching provisions, significant intrusions into party auton-
omy, and pre-contractual disclosure requirements should be carefully
weighed up in determining if it would be a suitable model for commercial
transactions.  Furthermore, even as a consumer-protective measure, its
suitability should be measured against existing protections within the
ACL.  Finally, it must be doubted that even a suitably crafted opt-in struc-
ture would work within Australia.
A related issue for any reform structure—if it were to govern commer-
cial transactions—is how it would operate alongside the CISG, the law in
Australia for international sales.  The Australian government has an inter-
national obligation to implement the CISG.  Any design that covers both
cross border and domestic sales, even if it allowed parties to “opt out,”
would therefore involve a potential breach of this obligation.77
D. Swiss Proposal
The “Swiss Proposal” refers to a proposal put to the General Assembly
of the United Nations on May 8, 2012 by the Swiss government concerning
the CISG.78  The proposal supports “future work in the area of interna-
tional contract law.”79
Essentially, it suggests that, given the huge increase in the volume of
world trade over the past thirty years, perhaps:
[The] time has come for UNCITRAL (i) to undertake an assess-
ment of the operation of the [CISG] and related UNCITRAL in-
struments in light of practical needs of international business
parties today and tomorrow, and (ii) to discuss whether further
work both in these areas and in the broader context of general
76. See Schwenzer, supra note 73, at 101.
77. See Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 7.7.
78. See generally Swiss Proposal, supra note 57.
79. Id. at 1.
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contract law is desirable and feasible on a global level to meet
those needs.80
The proposal draws attention to the fact that the CISG does not gov-
ern certain important areas, but leaves them to domestic law.81  One such
area is validity, another is ownership of goods.  Naturally, the remaining
differences in ascertaining the content of different domestic laws, and
drafting standard terms to deal with them, involves transaction costs.
The proposal highlights a few key aspects for possible future work.
First, the areas left of the CISG’s coverage: agency, validity, battle of the
forms, specific performance, applicable interest rates, mistake, fraud, du-
ress, gross disparity, illegality, unfair terms, third party rights, set-off, as-
signment, and multi-party contracts.82  The proposal also points out that
regional harmonization efforts have the potential to cause
fragmentation.83
Essentially then, the Swiss Proposal seeks support for the notion of
extending the subject matter of the CISG to closely associated areas that
were previously avoided in the belief that the work should be done in a
different instrument, or that consensus was unlikely at the time.  It does
not seek to overhaul the structure of the CISG in any way that might jeop-
ardize its, so far, largely successful operation around the world.
The proposal was considered in June–July 2012, and met with mixed
responses.  Therefore, the Swiss Proposal remains, although future direc-
tions for it have not yet been agreed upon.  An UNCITRAL Expert Group
Meeting held in February 2013 in Seoul, Korea, further discussed the
issue.
VI. PROCESS INTO THE FUTURE
Given Australia’s resistance to reform in the past, it would be more
surprising still if Australia moved to a national contract law code, let alone
one based on any international instrument.  While this author would most
favour a slowly developed, centralized, and easily accessible contract code
based on CISG, and drawing on UNIDROIT Principles where appropriate,
as the solution most likely to lead to an efficient and modern law of con-
tract for Australia, this outcome is unfortunately unlikely.
More likely is the potential for a gradual movement, perhaps with the
issue of an initial persuasive “restatement of contract principles,” in the
hope that this will sway courts and practitioners to adjust to the potential
for hard law changes in the future.  The importance of building a wide
consensus for harmonized change amongst powerful lobby groups such as
practitioner bodies, law firms, and business and industry associations, has
80. Id. at 2.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 6–7 n.3.
83. See id. at 7.
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been proven time and again.  One need only look at the failure of Revised
Article 2 of the UCC, “which was published in 2003 and . . . soundly re-
jected by the [U.S.] states,”84 or the recent success of Brazilian industry
and professional groups in convincing the Brazilian government to accede
to the CISG.  Another possibility will be more modest hard law reforms
implemented by cooperation in each of the states.
No decision has yet been made on whether reform of any type should
take place.  No comment has been made in relation to the submissions or
public responses at all.  The deafening silence has now continued for
some nine months.
On October 16, 2012, in answer to a number of questions posed to
the Minister in a parliamentary committee about the status of the review,
the Minister presented a report on the review and simply stated, “[t]he
Government will consider the feedback received during the review to de-
termine the need for any reform and possible next steps.”85
As of January 18, 2013 there were still no further developments ema-
nating from within the department.86  Furthermore, at the time of writing,
the Federal Attorney-General had resigned, and a new Attorney-General
recently has begun his term in office.  The department is continuing in its
deliberations, and nothing is likely to be announced until later this year.
Moreover, a federal election looms large in September 2013.  Anyone still
holding their breath might be well advised to stop.
VII. CONCLUSION
One might expect that, one way or another, diversity between Austra-
lian states will be addressed, and furthermore, Australia may well move to
some soft law implementation of a more international set of contract rules
in place of the overly complex rules that exist today for domestic con-
tracts.  While one might logically expect the CISG and/or UNIDROIT
Principles to be the primary influence on this development, this will de-
pend on how far the federal government perceives a need for mandatory
consumer protective measures beyond those in existence under the Aus-
tralian ACL presently.  Should it make this a priority, one can expect that
84. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 35. R
85. REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 5.  This was the Minis-
ter’s response to each and every one of the following questions posed in the Senate
Standing Committee by Senator Brandis, including:
6. When will the review be finalised and released publicly?
7. Is an Australian contract code a possible outcome/recommendation of
the review?
8. What is the view of the Department on the possibility of an Australian
Contract code?
9. Does the Department subscribe to the view that a contract code will
add complexity and inefficiency to contracts in Australia?
See id. at 1–2.
86. Email from Attorney-General’s Department, to the author and Luke Not-
tage (Jan. 18, 2013) (on file with author).
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the CESL will be examined, although it may carry less influence given its
many detractors.
If the government were to create a broad restatement of principles,
the influence of the CISG and/or UNIDROIT Principles will have to be
tempered by the need for the government to navigate the skepticism with
which these have been received within Australia.  However, if this process
is conducted with a realist’s eye to the competing economic pressures
within the Australian legal environment, and the significant influence the
CISG has already had on domestic law reform in so many countries, then
one suspects that they will be given significant weight.
The Swiss Proposal may have some effect on this process.  While on
the one hand, it may eventually lead to the CISG being even more attrac-
tive as an international standard for law reform, on the other hand, it may
add some (largely unjustified) gravitas to the numerous and vocal detrac-
tors within the Australian legal profession.  It might wrongfully be per-
ceived as demonstrating that there is something “wrong” with the CISG.
In fact, the conservatism and simplicity that underscores its solutions are
its strength to date.  The CISG presents a well-accepted basis for reform.
By comparison to the ambitious but highly criticized CESL, this means
that, at least for commercial transactions, the CISG continues to provide a
widely accepted modern standard and steady blueprint.  The perception,
therefore, would be wrong.
However, especially in a country like Australia, perception is reality.
If the profession is already wary of the CISG on the ill-conceived basis that
it is “vague” or “unknown,” then inevitably, the news that it may be
amended will make such detractors even more uncomfortable with using
the CISG as a basis for domestic reform.
As yet, most at this stage have not learned of the Swiss Proposal.  It is
therefore of great importance that the Swiss Proposal is explained in a
pragmatic and open way to audiences within Australia.  Should the Austra-
lian government actively participate in the ongoing debate on the propo-
sal, this may assist in disseminating appropriate information to prevent
such a perception from arising.
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